Showing posts with label trial delays. Show all posts
Showing posts with label trial delays. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

REMOTE Redux: DTP trials are still hard

Maybe those pesky sites are good for something after all. 

It's been six years since Pfizer boldly announced the launch of its "clinical trial in a box". The REMOTE trial was designed to be entirely online, and involved no research sites: study information and consent was delivered via the web, and medications and diaries were shipped directly to patients' homes.

Despite the initial fanfare, within a month REMOTE's registration on ClinicalTrials.gov was quietly reduced from 600 to 283. The smaller trial ended not with a bang but a whimper, having randomized only 18 patients in over a year of recruiting.

Still, the allure of direct to patient clinical trials remains strong, due to a confluence of two factors. First, a frenzy of interest in running "patient centric clinical trials". Sponsors are scrambling to show they are doing something – anything – to show they have shifted to a patient-centered mindset. We cannot seem to agree what this means (as a great illustration of this, a recent article in Forbes on "How Patients Are Changing Clinical Trials" contained no specific examples of actual trials that had been changed by patients), but running a trial that directly engages patients wherever they are seems like it could work.

The less-openly-discussed other factor leading to interest in these DIY trials is sponsors' continuing willingness to heap almost all of the blame for slow-moving studies onto their research sites. If it’s all the sites’ fault – the reasoning goes – then cutting them out of the process should result in trials that are both faster and cheaper. (There are reasons to be skeptical about this, as I have discussed in the past, but the desire to drop all those pesky sites is palpable.)

However, while a few proof-of-concept studies have been done, there really doesn't seem to have been another trial to attempt a full-blown direct-to-patient clinical trial. Other pilots have been more successful, but had fairly lightweight protocols. For all its problems, REMOTE was a seriously ambitious project that attempted to package a full-blown interventional clinical trial, not an observational study.

In this context, it's great to see published results of the TAPIR Trial in vasculitis, which as far as I can tell is the first real attempt to run a DIY trial of a similar magnitude to REMOTE.

TAPIR was actually two parallel trials, identical in every respect except for their sites: one trial used a traditional group of 8 sites, while the other was virtual and recruited patients from anywhere in the country. So this was a real-time, head-to-head assessment of site performance.

And the results after a full two years of active enrollment?
  • Traditional sites: 49 enrolled
  • Patient centric: 10 enrolled
Even though we’re six years later, and online/mobile communications are even more ubiquitous, we still see the exact same struggle to enroll patients.

Maybe it’s time to stop blaming the sites? To be fair, they didn’t exactly set the world on fire – and I’m guessing the total cost of activating the 8 sites significantly exceeded the costs of setting up the virtual recruitment and patient logistics. But still, the site-less, “patient centric” approach once again came up astonishingly short.


ResearchBlogging.org Krischer J, Cronholm PF, Burroughs C, McAlear CA, Borchin R, Easley E, Davis T, Kullman J, Carette S, Khalidi N, Koening C, Langford CA, Monach P, Moreland L, Pagnoux C, Specks U, Sreih AG, Ytterberg S, Merkel PA, & Vasculitis Clinical Research Consortium. (2017). Experience With Direct-to-Patient Recruitment for Enrollment Into a Clinical Trial in a Rare Disease: A Web-Based Study. Journal of medical Internet research, 19 (2) PMID: 28246067

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Questionable Enrollment Math(s) - the Authors Respond

The authors of the study I blogged about on Monday were kind enough to post a lengthy comment, responding in part to some of the issues I raised. I thought their response was interesting, and so reprint it in its entirety below, interjecting my own reactions as well.

There were a number of points you made in your blog and the title of questionable maths was what caught our eye and so we reply on facts and provide context.

Firstly, this is a UK study where the vast majority of UK clinical trials take place in the NHS. It is about patient involvement in mental health studies - an area where recruitment is difficult because of stigma and discrimination.

I agree, in hindsight, that I should have titled the piece “questionable maths” rather than my Americanized “questionable math”. Otherwise, I think this is fine, although I’m not sure that anything here differs from my post.

1. Tripling of studies - You dispute NIHR figures recorded on a national database and support your claim with a lone anecdote - hardly data that provides confidence. The reason we can improve recruitment is that NIHR has a Clinical Research Network which provides extra staff, within the NHS, to support high quality clinical studies and has improved recruitment success.

To be clear, I did not “dispute” the figures so much as I expressed sincere doubt that those figures correspond with an actual increase in actual patients consenting to participate in actual UK studies. The anecdote explains why I am skeptical – it's a bit like I've been told there was a magnitude 8 earthquake in Chicago, but neither I nor any of my neighbors felt anything. There are many reasons why reported numbers can increase in the absence of an actual increase. It’s worth noting that my lack of confidence in the NIHR's claims appears to be shared by the 2 UK-based experts quoted by Applied Clinical Trials in the article I linked to.

2. Large database: We have the largest database of detailed study information and patient involvement data - I have trawled the world for a bigger one and NIMH say there certainly isn't one in the USA. This means few places where patient impact can actually be measured
3. Number of studies: The database has 374 studies which showed among other results that service user involvement increased over time probably following changes by funders e.g. NIHR requests information in the grant proposal on how service users have been and will be involved - one of the few national funders to take this issue seriously.

As far as I can tell, neither of these points is in dispute.

4. Analysis of patient involvement involves the 124 studies that have completed. You cannot analyse recruitment success unless then.

I agree you cannot analyze recruitment success in studies that have not yet completed. My objection is that in both the KCL press release and the NIHR-authored Guardian article, the only number mentioned in 374, and references to the recruitment success findings came immediately after references to that number. For example:

Published in the British Journal of Psychiatry, the researchers analysed 374 studies registered with the Mental Health Research Network (MHRN).
Studies which included collaboration with service users in designing or running the trial were 1.63 times more likely to recruit to target than studies which only consulted service users.  Studies which involved more partnerships - a higher level of Patient and Public Involvement (PPI) - were 4.12 times more likely to recruit to target.

The above quote clearly implies that the recruitment conclusions were based on an analysis of 374 studies – a sample 3 times larger than the sample actually used. I find this disheartening.

The complexity measure was developed following a Delphi exercise with clinicians, clinical academics and study delivery staff to include variables likely to be barriers to recruitment. It predicts delivery difficulty (meeting recruitment & delivery staff time). But of course you know all that as it was in the paper.

Yes, I did know this, and yes, I know it because it was in the paper. In fact, that’s all I know about this measure, which is what led me to characterize it as “arbitrary and undocumented”. To believe that all aspects of protocol complexity that might negatively affect enrollment have been adequately captured and weighted in a single 17-point scale requires a leap of faith that I am not, at the moment, able to make. The extraordinary claim that all complexity issues have been accounted for in this model requires extraordinary evidence, and “we conducted a Delphi exercise” does not suffice.  

6. All studies funded by NIHR partners were included – we only excluded studies funded without peer review, not won competitively. For the involvement analysis we excluded industry studies because of not being able to contact end users and where inclusion compromised our analysis reliability due to small group sizes.

It’s only that last bit I was concerned about. Specifically, the 11 studies that were excluded due to being in “clinical groups” that were too small, despite the fact that “clinical groups” appear to have been excluded as non-significant from the final model of recruitment success.

(Also: am I being whooshed here? In a discussion of "questionable math" the authors' enumeration goes from 4 to 6. I’m going to take the miscounting here as a sly attempt to see if I’m paying attention...)

I am sure you are aware of the high standing of the journal and its robust peer review. We understand that our results must withstand the scrutiny of other scientists but many of your comments were unwarranted. This is the first in the world to investigate patient involvement impact. No other databases apart from the one held by the NIHR Mental Health Research Network is available to test – we only wish they were.

I hope we can agree that peer review – no matter how "high standing" the journal – is not a shield against concern and criticism. Despite the length of your response, I’m still at a loss as to which of my comments specifically were unwarranted.

In fact, I feel that I noted very clearly that my concerns about the study’s limitations were minuscule compared to my concerns about the extremely inaccurate way that the study has been publicized by the authors, KCL, and the NIHR. Even if I conceded every possible criticism of the study itself, there remains the fact that in public statements, you
  1. Misstated an odds ratio of 4 as “4 times more likely to”
  2. Overstated the recruitment success findings as being based on a sample 3 times larger than it actually was
  3. Re-interpreted, without reservation, a statistical association as a causal relationship
  4. Misstated the difference between the patient involvement categories as being a matter of merely “involving just one or two patients in the study team”
And you did these consistently and repeatedly – in Dr Wykes's blog post, in the KCL press release, and in the NIHR-written Guardian article.

To use the analogy from my previous post: if a pharmaceutical company had committed these acts in public statements about a new drug, public criticism would have been loud and swift.

Your comment on the media coverage of odds ratios is an issue that scientists need to overcome (there is even a section in Wikipedia).

It's highly unfair to blame "media coverage" for the use of an odds ratio as if it were a relative risk ratio. In fact, the first instance of "4 times more likely" appears in Dr Wykes's own blog post. It's repeated in the KCL press release, so you yourselves appear to have been the source of the error.

You point out the base rate issue but of course in a logistic regression you also take into account all the other variables that may impinge on the outcome prior to assessing the effects of our key variable patient involvement - as we did – and showed that the odds ratio is 4.12 - So no dispute about that. We have followed up our analysis to produce a statement that the public will understand. Using the following equations:
Model predicted recruitment lowest level of involvement exp(2.489-.193*8.8-1.477)/(1+exp(2.489-.193*8.8-1.477))=0.33
Model predicted recruitment highest level of involvement exp(2.489-.193*8.8-1.477+1.415)/(1+exp(2.489-.193*8.8-1.477+1.415)=0.67
For a study of typical complexity without a follow up increasing involvement from the lowest to the highest levels increased recruitment from 33% to 66% i.e. a doubling.

So then, you agree that your prior use of “4 times more likely” was not true? Would you be willing to concede that in more or less direct English?

This is important and is the first time that impact has been shown for patient involvement on the study success.
Luckily in the UK we have a network that now supports clinicians to be involved and a system for ensuring study feasibility.
The addition of patient involvement is the additional bonus that allows recruitment to increase over time and so cutting down the time for treatments to get to patients.

No, and no again. This study shows an association in a model. The gap between that and a causal relationship is far too vast to gloss over in this manner.

In summary, I thank the authors for taking the time to response, but I feel they've overreacted to my concerns about the study, and seriously underreacted to my more important concerns about their public overhyping of the study. 

I believe this study provides useful, though limited, data about the potential relationship between patient engagement and enrollment success. On the other hand, I believe the public positioning of the study by its authors and their institutions has been exaggerated and distorted in clearly unacceptable ways. I would ask the authors to seriously consider issuing public corrections on the 4 points listed above.


Monday, September 16, 2013

Questionable Enrollment Math at the UK's NIHR

There has been considerable noise coming out of the UK lately about successes in clinical trial enrollment.

First, a couple months ago came the rather dramatic announcement that clinical trial participation in the UK had "tripled over the last 6 years". That announcement, by the chief executive of the
Sweet creature of bombast: is Sir John
writing press releases for the NIHR?
National Institute of Health Research's Clinical Research Network, was quickly and uncritically picked up by the media.

That immediately caught my attention. In large, global trials, most pharmaceutical companies I've worked with can do a reasonable job of predicting accrual levels in a given country. I like to think that if participation rates in any given country had jumped that heavily, I’d have heard something.

(To give an example: looking at a quite-typical study I worked on a few years ago: UK sites were overall slightly below the global average. The highest-enrolling countries were about 2.5 times as fast. So, a 3-fold increase in accruals would have catapulted the UK from below average to the fastest-enrolling country in the world.)

Further inquiry, however, failed to turn up any evidence that the reported tripling actually corresponded to more human beings enrolled in clinical trials. Instead, there is some reason to believe that all we witnessed was increased reporting of trial participation numbers.

Now we have a new source of wonder, and a new giant multiplier coming out of the UK. As the Director of the NIHR's Mental Health Research Network, Til Wykes, put it in her blog coverage of her own paper:
Our research on the largest database of UK mental health studies shows that involving just one or two patients in the study team means studies are 4 times more likely to recruit successfully.
Again, amazing! And not just a tripling – a quadrupling!

Understand: I spend a lot of my time trying to convince study teams to take a more patient-focused approach to clinical trial design and execution. I desperately want to believe this study, and I would love having hard evidence to bring to my clients.

At first glance, the data set seems robust. From the King's College press release:
Published in the British Journal of Psychiatry, the researchers analysed 374 studies registered with the Mental Health Research Network (MHRN).
Studies which included collaboration with service users in designing or running the trial were 1.63 times more likely to recruit to target than studies which only consulted service users.  Studies which involved more partnerships - a higher level of Patient and Public Involvement (PPI) - were 4.12 times more likely to recruit to target.
But here the first crack appears. It's clear from the paper that the analysis of recruitment success was not based on 374 studies, but rather a much smaller subset of 124 studies. That's not mentioned in either of the above-linked articles.

And at this point, we have to stop, set aside our enthusiasm, and read the full paper. And at this point, critical doubts begin to spring up, pretty much everywhere.

First and foremost: I don’t know any nice way to say this, but the "4 times more likely" line is, quite clearly, a fiction. What is reported in the paper is a 4.12 odds ratio between "low involvement" studies and "high involvement" studies (more on those terms in just a bit).  Odds ratios are often used in reporting differences between groups, but they are unequivocally not the same as "times more likely than".

This is not a technical statistical quibble. The authors unfortunately don’t provide the actual success rates for different kinds of studies, but here is a quick example that, given other data they present, is probably reasonably close:

  • A Studies: 16 successful out of 20 
    • Probability of success: 80% 
    • Odds of success: 4 to 1
  • B Studies: 40 successful out of 80
    • Probability of success: 50%
    • Odds of success: 1 to 1

From the above, it’s reasonable to conclude that A studies are 60% more likely to be successful than B studies (the A studies are 1.6 times as likely to succeed). However, the odds ratio is 4.0, similar to the difference in the paper. It makes no sense to say that A studies are 4 times more likely to succeed than B studies.

This is elementary stuff. I’m confident that everyone involved in the conduct and analysis of the MHRN paper knows this already. So why would Dr Wykes write this? I don’t know; it's baffling. Maybe someone with more knowledge of the politics of British medicine can enlighten me.

If a pharmaceutical company had promoted a drug with this math, the warning letters and fines would be flying in the door fast. And rightly so. But if a government leader says it, it just gets recycled verbatim.

The other part of Dr Wykes's statement is almost equally confusing. She claims that the enrollment benefit occurs when "involving just one or two patients in the study team". However, involving one or two patients would seem to correspond to either the lowest ("patient consultation") or the middle level of reported patient involvement (“researcher initiated collaboration”). In fact, the "high involvement" categories that are supposed to be associated with enrollment success are studies that were either fully designed by patients, or were initiated by patients and researchers equally. So, if there is truly a causal relationship at work here, improving enrollment would not be merely a function of adding a patient or two to the conversation.

There are a number of other frustrating aspects of this study as well. It doesn't actually measure patient involvement in any specific research program, but uses just 3 broad categories (that the researchers specified at the beginning of each study). It uses an arbitrary and undocumented 17-point scale to measure "study complexity", which collapses and quite likely underweights many critical factors into a single number. The enrollment analysis excluded 11 studies because they weren't adequate for a factor that was later deemed non-significant. And probably the most frustrating facet of the paper is that the authors share absolutely no descriptive data about the studies involved in the enrollment analysis. It would be completely impossible to attempt to replicate its methods or verify its analysis. Do the authors believe that "Public Involvement" is only good when it’s not focused on their own work?

However, my feelings about the study and paper are an insignificant fraction of the frustration I feel about the public portrayal of the data by people who should clearly know better. After all, limited evidence is still evidence, and every study can add something to our knowledge. But the public misrepresentation of the evidence by leaders in the area can only do us harm: it has the potential to actively distort research priorities and funding.

Why This Matters

We all seem to agree that research is too slow. Low clinical trial enrollment wastes time, money, and the health of patients who need better treatment options.

However, what's also clear is that we lack reliable evidence on what activities enable us to accelerate the pace of enrollment without sacrificing quality. If we are serious about improving clinical trial accrual, we owe it to our patients to demand robust evidence for what works and what doesn’t. Relying on weak evidence that we've already solved the problem ("we've tripled enrollment!") or have a method to magically solve it ("PPI quadrupled enrollment!") will cause us to divert significant time, energy, and human health into areas that are politically favored but less than certain to produce benefit. And the overhyping those results by research leadership compounds that problem substantially. NIHR leadership should reconsider its approach to public discussion of its research, and practice what it preaches: critical assessment of the data.

[Update Sept. 20: The authors of the study have posted a lengthy comment below. My follow-up is here.]
 
[Image via flikr user Elliot Brown.]


ResearchBlogging.org Ennis L, & Wykes T (2013). Impact of patient involvement in mental health research: longitudinal study. The British journal of psychiatry : the journal of mental science PMID: 24029538


Thursday, May 30, 2013

Clinical Trial Enrollment, ASCO 2013 Edition

Even by the already-painfully-embarrassingly-low standards of clinical trial enrollment in general, patient enrollment in cancer clinical trials is slow. Horribly slow. In many cancer trials, randomizing one patient every three or four months isn't bad at all – in fact, it's par for the course. The most
commonly-cited number is that only 3% of cancer patients participate in a trial – and although exact details of how that number is measured are remarkably difficult to pin down, it certainly can't be too far from reality.

Ultimately, the cost of slow enrollment is borne almost entirely by patients; their payment takes the form of fewer new therapies and less evidence to support their treatment decisions.

So when a couple dozen thousand of the world's top oncologists fly into Chicago to meet, you'd figure that improving accrual would be high on everyone’s agenda. You can't run your trial without patients, after all.

But every year, the annual ASCO meeting underdelivers in new ideas for getting more patients into trials. I suppose this a consequence of ASCO's members-only focus: getting the oncologists themselves to address patient accrual is a bit like asking NASCAR drivers to tackle the problems of aerodynamics, engine design, and fuel chemistry.

Nonetheless, every year, a few brave souls do try. Here is a quick rundown of accrual-related abstracts at this year’s meeting, conveniently sorted into 3 logical categories:

1. As Lord Kelvin may or may not have said, “If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.”


Probably the most sensible of this year's crop, because rather than trying to make something out of nothing, the authors measure exactly how pervasive the nothing is. Specifically, they attempt to obtain fairly basic patient accrual data for the last three years' worth of clinical trials in kidney cancer. Out of 108 trials identified, they managed to get – via search and direct inquiries with the trial sponsors – basic accrual data for only 43 (40%).

That certainly qualifies as “terrible”, though the authors content themselves with “poor”.

Interestingly, exactly zero of the 32 industry-sponsored trials responded to the authors' initial survey. This fits with my impression that pharma companies continue to think of accrual data as proprietary, though what sort of business advantage it gives them is unclear. Any one company will have only run a small fraction of these studies, greatly limiting their ability to draw anything resembling a valid conclusion.


CALGB investigators look at 110 trials over the past 10 years to see if they can identify any predictive markers of successful enrollment. Unfortunately, the trials themselves are pretty heterogeneous (accrual periods ranged from 6 months to 8.8 years), so finding a consistent marker for successful trials would seem unlikely.

And, in fact, none of the usual suspects (e.g., startup time, disease prevalence) appears to have been significant. The exception was provision of medication by the study, which was positively associated with successful enrollment.

The major limitation with this study, apart from the variability of trials measured, is in its definition of “successful”, which is simply the total number of planned enrolled patients. Under both of their definitions, a slow-enrolling trial that drags on for years before finally reaching its goal is successful, whereas if that same trial had been stopped early it is counted as unsuccessful. While that sometimes may be the case, it's easy to imagine situations where allowing a slow trial to drag on is a painful waste of resources – especially if results are delayed enough to bring their relevance into question.

Even worse, though, is that a trial’s enrollment goal is itself a prediction. The trial steering committee determines how many sites, and what resources, will be needed to hit the number needed for analysis. So in the end, this study is attempting to identify predictors of successful predictions, and there is no reason to believe that the initial enrollment predictions were made with any consistent methodology.

2. If you don't know, maybe ask somebody?



With these two abstracts we celebrate and continue the time-honored tradition of alchemy, whereby we transmute base opinion into golden data. The magic number appears to be 100: if you've got 3 digits' worth of doctors telling you how they feel, that must be worth something.

In the first abstract, a working group is formed to identify and vote on the major barriers to accrual in oncology trials. Then – and this is where the magic happens – that same group is asked to identify and vote on possible ways to overcome those barriers.

In the second, a diverse assortment of community oncologists were given an online survey to provide feedback on the design of a phase 3 trial in light of recent new data. The abstract doesn't specify who was initially sent the survey, so we cannot tell response rate, or compare survey responders to the general population (I'll take a wild guess and go with “massive response bias”).

Market research is sometimes useful. But what cancer clinical trial do not need right now are more surveys are working groups. The “strategies” listed in the first abstract are part of the same cluster of ideas that have been on the table for years now, with no appreciable increase in trial accrual.

3. The obligatory “What the What?” abstract



The force with which my head hit my desk after reading this abstract made me concerned that it had left permanent scarring.

If this had been re-titled “Poor Measurement of Accrual Factors Leads to Inaccurate Accrual Reporting”, would it still have been accepted for this year’s meeting? That's certainly a more accurate title.

Let’s review: a trial intends to enroll both white and minority patients. Whites enroll much faster, leading to a period where only minority patients are recruited. Then, according to the authors, “an almost 4-fold increase in minority accrual raises question of accrual disparity.” So, sites will only recruit minority patients when they have no choice?

But wait: the number of sites wasn't the same during the two periods, and start-up times were staggered. Adjusting for actual site time, the average minority accrual rate was 0.60 patients/site/month in the first part and 0.56 in the second. So the apparent 4-fold increase was entirely an artifact of bad math.

This would be horribly embarrassing were it not for the fact that bad math seems to be endemic in clinical trial enrollment. Failing to adjust for start-up time and number of sites is so routine that not doing it is grounds for a presentation.

The bottom line


What we need now is to rigorously (and prospectively) compare and measure accrual interventions. We have lots of candidate ideas, and there is no need for more retrospective studies, working groups, or opinion polls to speculate on which ones will work best.  Where possible, accrual interventions should themselves be randomized to minimize confounding variables which prevent accurate assessment. Data needs to be uniformly and completely collected. In other words, the standards that we already use for clinical trials need to be applied to the enrollment measures we use to engage patients to participate in those trials.

This is not an optional consideration. It is an ethical obligation we have to cancer patients: we need to assure that we are doing all we can to maximize the rate at which we generate new evidence and test new therapies.

[Image credit: Logarithmic turtle accrual rates courtesy of Flikr user joleson.]

Friday, January 25, 2013

Less than Jaw-Dropping: Half of Sites Are Below Average


Last week, the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development unleashed the latest in their occasional series of dire pronouncements about the state of pharmaceutical clinical trials.

One particular factoid from the CSDD "study" caught my attention:
Shocking performance stat:
57% of these racers won't medal!
* 11% of sites in a given trial typically fail to enroll a single patient, 37% under-enroll, 39% meet their enrollment targets, and 13% exceed their targets.
Many industry reporters uncritically recycled those numbers. Pharmalot noted:
Now, the bad news – 48 percent of the trial sites miss enrollment targets and study timelines often slip, causing extensions that are nearly double the original duration in order to meeting enrollment levels for all therapeutic areas.
(Fierce Biotech and Pharma Times also picked up the same themes and quotes from the Tufts PR.)

There are two serious problems with the data as reported.

One: no one – neither CSDD nor the journalists who loyally recycle its press releases – seem to remember this CSDD release from less than two years ago. It made the even-direr claim that
According to Tufts CSDD, two-thirds of investigative sites fail to meet the patient enrollment requirements for a given clinical trial.
If you believe both Tufts numbers, then it would appear that the number of under-performing sites has dropped almost 20% in just 20 months – from 67% in April 2011 to 48% in January 2013. For an industry as hidebound and slow-moving as drug development, this ought to be hailed as a startling and amazing improvement!

Maybe at the end of the day, 48% isn't a great number, but surely this would appear to indicate we're on the right track, right? Why would no one mention this?

Which leads me to problem two: I suspect that no one is connecting the 2 data points because no one is sure what it is we're even supposed to be measuring here.

In a clinical trial, a site's "enrollment target" is not an objectively-defined number. Different sponsors will have different ways of setting targets – in fact, the method for setting targets may vary from team to team within a single pharma company.

The simplest way to set a target is to divide the total number of expected patients by the number of sites. If you have 50 sites and want to enroll 500 patients, then viola ... everyone's got a "target" of 10 patients! But then as soon as some sites start exceeding their target, others will, by definition, fall short. That’s not necessarily a sign of underperformance – in fact, if a trial finishes enrollment dramatically ahead of schedule, there will almost certainly be a large number of "under target" sites.

Some sponsors and CROs get tricky about setting individual targets for each site. How do they set those? The short answer is: pretty arbitrarily. Targets are only partially based upon data from previous, similar (but not identical) trials, but are also shifted up or down by the (real or perceived) commercial urgency of the trial. They can also be influenced by a variety of subjective beliefs about the study protocol and an individual study manager's guesses about how the sites will perform.

If a trial ends with 0% of sites meeting their targets, the next trial in that indication will have a lower, more achievable target. The same will happen in the other direction: too-easy targets will be ratcheted up. The benchmark will jump around quite a bit over time.

As a result, "Percentage of trial sites meeting enrollment target" is, to put it bluntly, completely worthless as an aggregate performance metric. Not only will it change greatly based upon which set  of sponsors and studies you happen to look at, but even data from the same sponsors will wobble heavily over time.

Why does this matter?

There is a consensus that clinical development is much too slow -- we need to be striving to shorten clinical trial timelines and get drugs to market sooner. If we are going to make any headway in this effort, we need to accurately assess the forces that help or hinder the pace of development, and we absolutely must rigorously benchmark and test our work. The adoption of, and attention paid to unhelpful metrics will only confuse and delay our effort to improve the quality of speed of drug development.

[Photo of "underperforming" swimmers courtesy Boston Public Library on flikr.]

Tuesday, December 11, 2012

What (If Anything) Improves Site Enrollment Performance?

ENACCT has released its final report on the outcomes from the National Cancer Clinical Trials Pilot Breakthrough Collaborative (NCCTBC), a pilot program to systematically identify and implement better enrollment practices at five US clinical trial sites. Buried after the glowing testimonials and optimistic assessments is a grim bottom line: the pilot program didn't work.

Here are the monthly clinical trial accruals at each of the 5 sites. The dashed lines mark when the pilots were implemented:



4 of the 5 sites showed no discernible improvement. The one site that did show increasing enrollment appears to have been improving before any of the interventions kicked in.

This is a painful but important result for anyone involved in clinical research today, because the improvements put in place through the NCCTBC process were the product of an intensive, customized approach. Each site had 3 multi-day learning sessions to map out and test specific improvements to their internal communications and processes (a total of 52 hours of workshops). In addition, each site was provided tracking tools and assigned a coach to assist them with specific accrual issues.

That’s an extremely large investment of time and expertise for each site. If the results had been positive, it would have been difficult to project how NCCTBC could be scaled up to work at the thousands of research sites across the country. Unfortunately, we don’t even have that problem: the needle simple did not move.

While ENACCT plans a second round of pilot sites, I think we need to face a more sobering reality: we cannot squeeze more patients out of sites through training and process improvements. It is widely believed in the clinical research industry that sites are low-efficiency bottlenecks in the enrollment process. If we could just "fix" them, the thinking goes – streamline their workflow, improve their motivation – we could quickly improve the speed at which our trials complete. The data from the NCCTBC paints an entirely different picture, though. It shows us that even when we pour large amounts of time and effort into a tailored program of "evidence and practice-based changes", our enrollment ROI may be nonexistent.

I applaud the ENACCT team for this pilot, and especially for sharing the full monthly enrollment totals at each site. This data should cause clinical development teams everywhere to pause and reassess their beliefs about site enrollment performance and how to improve it.

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

What We Can Anticipate from TransCelerate


TransCelerate: Pharma's great kumbaya moment?
Last week, 10 of the largest pharmaceutical companies caused quite a hullaballoo in the research world with their announcement that they were anteing up to form a new nonprofit entity “to identify and solve common drug development challenges with the end goals of improving the quality of clinical studies and bringing new medicines to patients faster”. The somewhat-awkwardly-named TransCelerate BioPharma immediately got an enthusiastic reception from industry watchers and participants, mainly due to the perception that it was well poised to attack some of the systemic causes of delays and cost overruns that plague clinical trials today.

I myself was caught up in the breathless excitement of the moment, immediately tweeting after reading the initial report:

 Over the past few days, though, I've had time to re-read and think more about the launch announcement, and dial down my enthusiasm considerably.  I still think it’s a worthwhile effort, but it’s probably not fair to expect anything that fundamentally changes much in the way of current trial execution.

Mostly, I’m surprised by the specific goals selected, which seem for the most part either tangential to the real issues in modern drug development or stepping into areas where an all-big-pharma committee isn’t the best tool for the job. I’m also very concerned that a consortium like this would launch without a clearly-articulated vision of how it fits in with, and adds to, the ongoing work of other key players – the press release is loaded with positive, but extremely vague, wording about how TransCelerate will work with, but be different from, groups such as the CTTI and CDISC. The new organization also appears to have no formal relationship with any CRO organizations.  Given the crucial and deeply embedded nature of CROs in today’s research, this is not a detail to be worked out later; it is a vital necessity if any worthwhile progress is to be made.

Regarding the group’s goals, here is what their PR had to say:
Five projects have been selected by the group for funding and development, including: development of a shared user interface for investigator site portals, mutual recognition of study site qualification and training, development of risk-based site monitoring approach and standards, development of clinical data standards, and establishment of a comparator drug supply model.
Let’s take these five projects one by one, to try to get a better picture of TransCelerate’s potential impact:

1. Development of a shared user interface for investigator site portals

Depending on how it’s implemented, the impact of this could range from “mildly useful” to “mildly irksome”. Sure, I hear investigators and coordinators complain frequently about all the different accounts they have to keep track of, so having a single front door to multiple sponsor sites would be a relief. However, I don’t think that the problem of too many usernames cracks anyone’s “top 20 things wrong with clinical trial execution” list – it’s a trivial detail. Aggravating, but trivial.

Worse, if you do it wrong and develop a clunky interface, you’ll get a lot more grumbling about making life harder at the research site. And I think there’s a high risk of that, given that this is in effect software development by committee – and the committee is a bunch of companies that do not actually specialize in software development.

In reality, the best answer to this is probably a lot simpler than we imagine: if we had a neutral, independent body (such as the ACRP) set up a single sign-on (SSO) registry for investigators and coordinators, then all sponsors, CROs, and IVRS/IWRS/CDMS can simply set themselves up as service providers. (This works in the same way that many people today can log into disparate websites using their existing Google or Facebook accounts.)  TransCelerate might do better sponsoring and promoting an external standard than trying to develop an entirely new platform of its own.

2. Mutual recognition of study site qualification and training

This is an excellent step forward. It’s also squarely in the realm of “ideas so obvious we could have done them 10 years ago”. Forcing site personnel to attend multiple iterations of the same training seminars simply to ensure that you’ve collected enough binders full of completion certificates is a sad CYA exercise with no practical benefit to anyone.

This will hopefully re-establish some goodwill with investigators. However, it’s important to note that it’s pretty much a symbolic act in terms of efficiency and cost savings. Nothing wrong with that – heaven knows we need some relationship wins with our increasingly-disillusioned sites – but let’s not go crazy thinking that the represents a real cause of wasted time or money. In fact, it’s pretty clear that one of the reasons we’ve lived with the current site-unfriendly system for so long is that it didn’t really cost us anything to do so.

(It’s also worth pointing out that more than a few biotechs have already figured out, usually with CRO help, how to ensure that site personnel are properly trained and qualified without subjecting them to additional rounds of training.)

3. Development of risk-based site monitoring approach and standards

The consensus belief and hope is that risk-based monitoring is the future of clinical trials. Ever since FDA’s draft guidance on the topic hit the street last year, it’s been front and center at every industry event. It will, unquestionably, lead to cost savings (although some of those savings will hopefully be reinvested into more extensive centralized monitoring).  It will not necessarily shave a significant amount of time off the trials, since in many trials getting monitors out to sites to do SDV is not a rate-limiting factor, but it should still at the very least result in better data at lower cost, and that’s clearly a good thing.

So, the big question for me is: if we’re all moving in this direction already, do we need a new, pharma-only consortium to develop an “approach” to risk-based monitoring?

 First and foremost, this is a senseless conversation to have without the active involvement and leadership of CROs: in many cases, they understand the front-line issues in data verification and management far better than their pharma clients.  The fact that TransCelerate launched without a clear relationship with CROs and database management vendors is a troubling sign that it isn’t poised to make a true contribution to this area.

In a worst-case scenario, TransCelerate may actually delay adoption of risk-based monitoring among its member companies, as they may decide to hold off on implementation until standards have been drafted, circulated, vetted, re-drafted, and (presumably, eventually) approved by all 10 companies. And it will probably turn out that the approaches used will need to vary by patient risk and therapeutic area anyway, making a common, generic approach less than useful.

Finally, the notion that monitoring approaches require some kind of industry-wide “standardization” is extremely debatable. Normally, we work to standardize processes when we run into a lot of practical interoperability issues – that’s why we all have the same electric outlets in our homes, but not necessarily the same AC adaptors for our small devices.  It would be nice if all cell phone manufacturers could agree on a common standard plug, but the total savings from that standard would be small compared to the costs of defining and implementing it.  That’s the same with monitoring: each sponsor and each CRO have a slightly different flavor of monitoring, but the costs of adapting to any one approach for any given trial are really quite small.

Risk-based monitoring is great. If TransCelerate gets some of the credit for its eventual adoption, that’s fine, but I think the adoption is happening anyway, and TransCelerate may not be much help in reality.

4. Development of clinical data standards

This is by far the most baffling inclusion in this list. What happened to CDISC? What is CDISC not doing right that TransCelerate could possibly improve?

In an interview with Matthew Herper at Forbes, TransCelerate’s Interim CEO expands a bit on this point:
“Why do some [companies] record that male is a 0 and female is a 1, and others use 1 and 0, and others use M and F. Where is there any competitive advantage to doing that?” says Neil. “We do 38% of the clinical trials but 70% of the [spending on them]. IF we were to come together and try to define some of these standards it would be an enabler for efficiencies for everyone.”
It’s really worth noting that the first part of that quote has nothing to do with the second part. If I could wave a magic wand and instantly standardize all companies’ gender reporting, I would not have reduced clinical trial expenditures by 0.01%. Even if we extend this to lots of other data elements, we’re still not talking about a significant source of costs or time.

Here’s another way of looking at it: those companies that are conducting the other 62% of trials but are only responsible for 30% of the spending – how did they do it, since they certainly haven’t gotten together to agree on a standard format for gender coding?

But the main problem here is that TransCelerate is encroaching on the work of a respected, popular, and useful initiative – CDISC – without clearly explaining how it will complement and assist that initiative. Neil’s quote almost seems to suggest that he plans on supplanting CDISC altogether.  I don’t think that was the intent, but there’s no rational reason to expect TransCelerate to offer substantive improvement in this area, either.

5. Establishment of a comparator drug supply model

This is an area that I don’t have much direct experience in, so it’s difficult to estimate what impact TransCelerate will have. I can say, anecdotally, that over the past 10 years, exactly zero clinical trials I’ve been involved with have had significant issues with comparator drug supply. But, admittedly, that’s quite possibly a very unrepresentative sample of pharmaceutical clinical trials.

I would certainly be curious to hear some opinions about this project. I assume it’s a somewhat larger problem in Europe than in the US, given both their multiple jurisdictions and their stronger aversion to placebo control. I really can’t imagine that inefficiencies in acquiring comparator drugs (most of which are generic, and so not directly produced by TransCelerate’s members) represent a major opportunity to save time and money.

Conclusion

It’s important to note that everything above is based on very limited information at this point. The transcelerate.com website is still “under construction”, so I am only reacting to the press release and accompanying quotes. However, it is difficult to imagine at this point that TransCelerate’s current agenda will have more than an extremely modest impact on current clinical trials.  At best, it appears that it may identify some areas to cut some costs, though this is mostly through the adoption of risk-based monitoring, which should happen whether TransCelerate exists or not.

I’ll remain a fan of TransCelerate, and will follow its progress with great interest in the hopes that it outperforms my expectations. However, it would do us all well to recognize that TransCelerate probably isn’t going to change things very dramatically -- the many systemic problems that add to the time and cost of clinical trials today will still be with us, and we need to continue to work hard to find better paths forward.

[Update 10-Oct-2012: Wayne Kubick, the CTO of CDISC, has posted a response with some additional details around cooperation between TransCelerate and CDISC around point 4 above.]

Mayday! Mayday! Photo credit: "Wheatley Maypole Dance 2008" from flikr user net_efekt.