Pediatric post-marketing studies have been completed for over 200 compounds in the years since BPCA (2002, offering a reward of 6 months extra market exclusivity/patent life to any drug conducting requested pediatric studies) and PREA (2007, giving FDA power to require pediatric studies) were enacted. I think it is fair to say that at this point, it would be nice to have some sort of comprehensive idea of how FDA views the risks associated with treating children with medications tested only on adults. Are they in general less efficacious? More? Is PK in children predictable from adult studies a reasonable percentage of the time, or does it need to be recharacterized with every drug?
Essentially, my point is that BPCA/PREA is a pretty crude tool: it is both too broad in setting what is basically a single standard for all new adult medications, and too vague as to what exactly that standard is.
In fact, a 2008 published review from FDA staffers and a 2012 Institute of Medicine report both show one clear trend: in a significant majority of cases, pediatric studies resulted in validating the adult medication in children, mostly with predictable dose and formulation adjustments (77 of 108 compounds (71%) in the FDA review, and 27 of 45 (60%) in the IOM review, had label changes that simply reflected that use of the drug was acceptable in younger patients).
So, it seems, most of the time, children are in fact not terribly unlike small adults.
But it’s also true that the percentages of studies that show lack of efficacy, or bring to light a new safety issue with the drug’s use in children, is well above zero. There is some extremely important information here.
To paraphrase John Wanamaker: we know that half our PREA studies are a waste of time; we just don’t know which half.
This would seem to me to be the highest regulatory priority – to be able to predict which new drugs will work as expected in children, and which may truly require further study. After a couple hundred compounds have gone through this process, we really ought to be better positioned to understand how certain pharmacological properties might increase or decrease the risks of drugs behaving differently than expected in children. Unfortunately, neither the FDA nor the IOM papers venture any hypotheses about this – both end up providing long lists of examples of certain points, but not providing any explanatory mechanisms that might enable us to engage in some predictive risk assessment.
While FDASIA did not advance PREA in terms of more rigorously defining the scope of pediatric requirements (or, better yet, requiring FDA to do so), it did address one lingering concern by requiring that FDA publish non-compliance letters for sponsors that do not meet their commitments. (PREA, like FDAAA, is a bit plagued by lingering suspicions that it’s widely ignored by industry.)
The first batch of letters and responses has been published, and it offers some early insights into the problems engendered by the nebulous nature of PREA and its implementation.
These examples, unfortunately, are still a bit opaque – we will need to wait on the FDA responses to the sponsors to see if some of the counter-claims are deemed credible. In addition, there are a few references to prior deferral requests, but the details of the request (and rationales for the subsequent FDA denials) do not appear to be publicly available. You can read FDA’s take on the new postings on their blog, or in the predictably excellent coverage from Alec Gaffney at RAPS.
Looking through the first 4 drugs publicly identified for noncompliance, the clear trend is that there is no trend. All these PREA requirements have been missed for dramatically different reasons.
Here’s a quick rundown of the drugs at issue – and, more interestingly, the sponsor responses:
1. Renvela - Genzyme (full response)
Genzyme appears to be laying responsibility for the delay firmly at FDA’s feet here, basically claiming that FDA continued to pile on new requirements over time:
Genzyme’s correspondence with the FDA regarding pediatric plans and design of this study began in 2006 and included a face to face meeting with FDA in May 2009. Genzyme submitted 8 revisions of the pediatric study design based on feedback from FDA including that received in 4 General Advice Letters. The Advice Letter dated February 17, 2011 contained further recommendations on the study design, yet still required the final clinical study report by December 31, 2011.This highlights one of PREA’s real problems: the requirements as specified in most drug approval letters are not specific enough to fully dictate the study protocol. Instead, there is a lot of back and forth between the sponsor and FDA, and it seems that FDA does not always fully account for their own contribution to delays in getting studies started.
2. Hectorol - Genzyme (full response)
In this one, Genzyme blames the FDA not for too much feedback, but for none at all:
On December 22, 2010, Genzyme submitted a revised pediatric development plan (Serial No. 212) which was intended to address FDA feedback and concerns that had been received to date. This submission included proposed protocol HECT05310. [...] At this time, Genzyme has not received feedback from the FDA on the protocol included in the December 22, 2010 submission.If this is true, it appears extremely embarrassing for FDA. Have they really not provided feedback in over 2.5 years, and yet still sending noncompliance letters to the sponsor? It will be very interesting to see an FDA response to this.
3. Cleviprex – The Medicines Company (full response)
This is the only case where the pharma company appears to be clearly trying to game the system a bit. According to their response:
Recognizing that, due to circumstances beyond the company’s control, the pediatric assessment could not be completed by the due date, The Medicines Company notified FDA in September 2010, and sought an extension. At that time, it was FDA’s view that no extensions were available. Following the passage of FDASIA, which specifically authorizes deferral extensions, the company again sought a deferral extension in December 2012.So, after hearing that they had to move forward in 2010, the company promptly waited 2 years to ask for another extension. During that time, the letter seems to imply that they did not try to move the study forward at all, preferring to roll the dice and wait for changing laws to help them get out from under the obligation.
4. Twinject/Adrenaclick – Amedra (full response)
The details of this one are heavily redacted, but it may also be a bit of gamesmanship from the sponsor. After purchasing the injectors, Amedra asked for a deferral. When the deferral was denied, they simply asked for the requirements to be waived altogether. That seems backwards, but perhaps there's a good reason for that.
Clearly, 4 drugs is not a sufficient sample to say anything definitive, especially when we don't have FDA's take on the sponsor responses. However, it is interesting that these 4 cases seem to reflect an overall pattern with BCPA and PREA - results are scattershot and anecdotal. We could all clearly benefit from a more systematic assessment of why these trials work and why some of them don't, with a goal of someday soon abandoning one-size-fits-all regulation and focusing resources where they will do the most good.